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) 
[L. A. No. 22211. In Bank. Apr. 17, 1953.] 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS AN-
GELES, Petitioner, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., 
Respondents. 
[la,lb] Buildings-State Housing Act-Cooperation Agreement.-
Where city of Los Angeles pursuant to a statutory provision 
empowering it to do all things necessary to cooperatc in con-
struction of a housing project (Health & Saf. Code, § 34516) 
agreed "to cooperate with the Authority . . . by such other 
lawful action or ways as the Authority may find necessary 
in connection with the development and construction of the 
Projects," and this statutory provision and § 34311 of the 
same code, empowering the housing authority to execute con-
tracts "necessary or convenient to the exercise of its pow-
ers," were consistently interpreted by those charged with 
their administration as authorizing necessary proceedings, 
under the quoted contract provision, to annex a county island 
[1] Constitutionality, construction and application of s'tatutes 
or governmental projects for improvement of housing conditions 
(slum clearance), notes, 130 A.L.R. 1069; 172 A.L.R. 966. See, 
also, Am.Jur., Public Housing Laws, § 2. 
McK. Dig. References: fl,3] Buildings, § 5.1; [2] Statutes, 
§ 180(2). 
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or strip of land surrounded by territory entirely within the 
eity boundaries, such consistent course of oonduct showed 
that the city actually agreed to annex the county wand as 
a necessary step in the development ofa project located in 
the city, and such contract, being based on a correet inter-
pretation of the statutes, may not thereafter be abandoned by 
the city. 
[2] 8tatutea-Oonstruction-Oontemporaneo1l8 Oonstruction.-The 
contemporaneous administrative construction of a statute by 
those charged with its enforcement and interpretation, while 
not necessarily controlling, js entitled to great weight, and 
eourts generally will not depart from IUch· eonstruotion un-
less it js clearly erroneous or unauthorized. 
{S] Bulldinp-State HoUBing Act-Ob1iga.tiou of Oit)'Approviq 
Policr.-Where oity of Los Angeles js given discretionary 
power to determine .initially the need for h01l8ing authority 
to function, to give approval of a low-rent housing project, 
and to enter into a oooperation agreement, and where those 
initiallteps have been taken, there js nothing left for the 
city and housing authority to do, but to perform administra-
tively whatever is necessary to carry the agreement into ef-
fect, and the oity may not thereafter abrogate the contract 
or withdraw its approval of the development and construc-
tion of the project 
PROCEEDING in contempt for failure to comply with 
a writ of mandate. Respondents ordered to comply with writ 
of mandate. 
Faries & McDowell, Stanley .A. Furman, .1tIcIntyreFaries, 
LeonardS. Janofsky, Herman F. Belvin and Loeb 41 Loeb 
for Petitioner. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Frank P. Doherty, Special 
Counsel, William H. Neal, Bourke Jones and John L. Flynn, 
Assistant City Attorneys, Weldon L. Weber, Deputy City 
Attorney, Jerome Weber, Henry F. Walker, Bodkin, Breslin 
&. Luddy, Michael G. Luddy, William H. Rosenthal, Nat 
Rosin, Joseph Ostrow, Garner, Lillie & Bryant, Cameron L. 
Lillie and H.· P. McCarthy for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-:-The Housing Authority of the City of Los 
Angeles, by petition filed on August 4, 1952, seeks to have 
the members of the City Council of the City of Los .Angeles 
held in contempt of this court for their alleged failure to 
comply with the terms of a peremptory writ of mandate issued 
) 
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by this court on June 27, 1952. (Housing Authority v. Citg 
of Los Angeles, 88 Cal.2d 853 [243 P.2d 515], certiorari de-
nied, 844 U.S. 836 [73 S.Ct. 46, 97 L.Ed. 41].) That 
proceeding will be referred to in this opinion as the mandate 
proceeding. 
The mandate proceeding was brought to test the validity 
of the city's action of December 26, 1951, attempting to abro-
gate, cancel, and rescind the agreements authorized by Ordi-
nance No. 95,222 adopted on August 8, 1949. By that ordi-
nance the city approved construction of a lO,OOO-unit low-
rent housing project in cooperation with the housing authority : 
of the city and the Public Housing Administration of the 
United States pursuant to the State Housing Authorities Law 
and Housing Cooperation Law (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 34200-
34368, 34500-34521). The housing authority successfully 
sought to have this court declare invalid the city's.attempted 
withdrawal of its approval of the project and the attempted 
cancellation of its agreements, and to compel the city to 
p£'rform the acts required by the cooperation agreement and 
other agreements entered into by it with the housing authority 
for carrying out the contemplated project. We determined 
that since the city had approved the project, and the housing, 
authority and the Public Housing AdIninistration had made 
binding contractual commitments and advances in respect 
10 the project, the city was without power, in the absence of 
express statutory authority, to withdraw its approval or to 
abrogate its agreements. A writ of mandate. issued "direct-
'ing the respondents to perform the terms of the agreements 
entered into with the petitioner and to proceed in the ful1lll-' 
ment of its obligations thereunder." 
In the present proceeding the housing authority alleged 
various matters as to which it was claimed the city had agreed 
to take action and as to which it had refused to proceed, in 
violation of this court's order in the mandate proceeding. 
An order was issued directing the individual members of 
the city council to show cause why they should not be ad-
judged in contempt of this court for failing, neglecting, and i 
refusing to obey the peremptory writ of mandate. By reason I 
of a stipulation of the parties on the return to the order to ; 
show cause, the only charge remaining to be considered is: 
the failure of the city to complete annexation proceedings I 
that would include in the site selected for the West Los An-
geles (Cal. 4-21) project a county strip entirely surrounded . 
by incorporated territory. The facts relating to the failure 
) 
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to complete the proceeding to annex the county '''island'' are 
undisputed. 
On November 22, 1950, the city council approved and 
adopted a report of its Veterans' Mairs and Housing Com-
mittee recommending approval of the authority'. proposal 
to acquire 11 sites including the one now in question. The 
map of that site, submitted by the authority with its pro-
posal, showed the presence of the county island. Thereafter, 
an application to the planning commission for a conditional 
use of the site for a housing project was made. The descrip-
tion of the site recited that it lay "partly in unincorporated 
territory of the County of Los Angeles," and an attached 
report pointed out that there should be no difficulty in acquir-
ing title to the county strip and annexing it to the city. On 
April 26, 1951, the application was granted by the planning 
commission. An appeal was taken to the city council and 
denied by that body on June 26, 1951. Thereafter the 'au-
thority acquired title to the property comprising the county 
island and requested that the city council annex it. The usual 
procedure was promptly instituted, and after receiving re-
ports from various city departments, the coordinating board 
unanimously recommended approval of the proposed annexa-
tion. The council referred this recommendation to its plan-
ning committee, which reported back on October 24, 1951. 
It reported that the coordinating board had recommended an-
nexation "as requested by the Los Angeles Housing Author-
ity," and had advised that "the annexation of this strip 
would conform to the City's policy of absorbing county islands, 
thereby creating a more regular city boundary line. . • ." 
The council then adopted its committee's report recommend-
ing annexation, and ordered proceedings to that end com-
menced. Thereafter, however, the city attempted to rescind 
its cooperation agreement and terminate the development of 
all public housing projects thereunder. 
, The city contends not only that it has not contracted to 
annex territory, but that under the provisions of the Hous-
ing Authorities Law (Health & Sal. Code, § 84200 et seq.) 
and the Housing Cooperation Law (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 84500 et seq.) it has no power to do so. The city relies 
on section 84208 of the Health and Safety Code limiting the 
authority's area of operation to the city and section 84509 
permitting the city to cooperate in the 'planning, construc-
tion, and operation of housing projects only when they are 
/ 
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located "within the area in which it is authorized to act.", 
It also points out that there is no express statutory provision 
authorizing a city to annex territory pursuant to a coopera-
tion ~eement with a housing authority. 
It may be conceded that under the foregoing provisions 
the city and the authority do not have power to contract 
to develop a housing project completely outside the city limits 
or agree that the city shall annex territory for such a project. 
In the present ease, however, approximately 37 of the 43 
acres selected for the site lie in the city. The county terri- .. 
tory consists of a strip approximately 150 feet wide by 1,200 ' 
feet long that is entirely surrounded by the city and divides 
the site into two separate and approximately equal parts. It 
is entirely uninhabited and unimproved. Unless this island, 
which is an integral part of the site, is annexed, the project 
cannot be built. Thus the purpose of, annexation is not to. 
develop a project outside of the .city, but to make possible a 
project within the city in accordance with the slum-elearance 
and low-rent housing objectives contemplated by the housing 
legislation. The questions presented, therefore, arl! whether 
the city has contracted or legally can contract to annex such 
territory as is necessary for the development of a project 
within its limits. 
[la] The authority has the power to "Make and execute. 
contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient to. ~ 
the exercise of its powers" (Health .. Saf. Code, § 34311),: 'j 
and the city has authority to "Do any and all things, neces< ~~ .• 
sary or convenient, to aid and cooperate in the p]aDDjng,~: '.; 
undertaking, construction, or operation of" a housing proj-; ; 
act. (Health .. Saf. Code, § 34516.) Porrmant to this pro-~;,. 
vision the city agreed "to cooperate with the Authority ••• ~.~ 
by such other lawful action or ways as the Authority may find ;:. 
necessary in connection with the development and construc-
tion of the Projects." Before this controversy arose, these 
provisions of the housing acts were consistently interpreted 
by those charged with their administration and interpretation 
as authorizing the necessary annexation proceedings under the 
quoted contract provision. 
The consistent course of conduct followed by the . city be-
fore it attempted to abrogate the entire housing program 
makes clear that it agreed to annex the county· island as a 
necessary step in the development of a project located in the 
city. (WoodbiftB v. Vaft Hom., 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 [173 P.2d 
17]; DavBftpori v. Davenport Foundation, 36 Cal.M 67, 73-74 
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(222 P.2d 11].) That course of conduct, however, amounted 
to more than a practical construction of the 'COntract between 
the parties; it also constituted an interpretation of the Statutes 
upon which the contract was based. [I] '" [T]he contem-
. poraneous administrative construction of the enactment by 
those charged with its enforcement and interpretation is en-
titled to great weight, and courts generally will not depart 
from such interpretation unless it is clearly erroneous or 
unauthorized.' (Coco-Cola Co. v. 8'G'eBoard 01 EqualUo.-
lion, 25 Cal.2d 918, 921 {IS6 P.2d 1] •••. )" (Richfield 
Oil Corp. v. CrGtDford, 39 Cal.2d 729, 786[249 P.2d 600].) 
[Ib] We have concluded that the interpretation heretofore 
placed upon the statutes and contract by the parties is cor-
Tect. The authority is not attempting to expand' its ter-
ritorial jurisdiction by developing a project outside of the 
city. It is seeking only to dectuate its purposes within the 
city. .As pointed out by the city plaDDing department, "An-
nexation, as proposed, would permit the aonsolidation of the 
housing program entirely within the limits of the City of 
Los Angeles, absorb an' island which is presently located 
within the County of Los Angeles, surrounded entirely by 
the City limits of Los Angeles, and permit the construction 
of the necessar,y sewers to serve the residences within the 
. proposed housing development which cannot be" constructed 
'if the narrow strip of Oounty land is not annexed to the City 
·of Los Angeles. ~ • ." 
[8] It is now settled that the city has no right to abro-
; gate the contract· here involved or to withchiw its approval 
oithe development 'and construction of these projects. 
" [H] aving taken the initial discretionary action to bring 
the housing authority into operation and having· approved 
a project and entered into a cooperation agreement, there 
was nothing left to be done by either contracting party but 
to perform administratively whatever was necessary to carry 
the agreement into effect .... [T]he law enjoins upon the 
city the duty to perform the terms of its agreements entered 
into with the housing authority and to. go forward with the 
exercise of the powers which it has agreed to undertake in 
cooperating with that authority." (Bowring ,A"tlorit" v. 
Cit" 01 Los ,Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 853, 862, 871 [243 P.2d 515].) 
There is nothing in the statutes governing the terri-
torial jurisdiction of. the city and the authority that per-
mits the city to evade its duty pro tan'o by departing from . 
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its established policy of annexing unincorporated islands. The 
authority selected, and the city council approved, a site se-
lected in the city. To develop a project on that site it is 
admittedly necessary that the county island be annexed. Both 
the city and the authority have power to do what is neces-
sary to develop projects in the city, and the city has con-
tracted toexereise such power when requested by the au-
thority to do 80. 
Since the question of annexation was not specifically pre-
sented in the mandate . proceeding,we are of the opinion 
'that respondents should not be fined for contempt. Petitioner 
seeks no more at this time than to have respondents ordered . 
to complete annexation of the county island. We may make 
such an order Under section 1097 of the Code of Civil Pro- .. 
cedure. 
Respondents are ordered to comply with the writ of man-
date heretofore issued by annexing the territory in question. 
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the reasoning and the conclusion 
in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor that the 
action of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles in re-
fusing to annex the strip of land (county island) embraced 
within the West Los Angeles Housing Authority Project con-
stituted a violation of the agreement between the authority 
and the city which the city was directed to perform by the 
writ of mandate issued by this court in Housing Authorit" . 
v. Cit" of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 853 [243 P.2d 515], but I . 
. do not agree that no punishment should be imposed for thel ... J 
refusal of the city to obey said writ. . . .' , .. ~ 
While I think there is no question that the contract ~I 
tween the city and the authority clearly contemplated the an- .: 
nexation of land which might be considered necessary for 
the contemplated project, it is .clear that under the factual 
situation disclosed by the agreed statement of facta in this 
proceeding, the city is estopped to deny annexation of the 
area here involved by its conduct which induced the authority 
to believe that the annexation proceeding would be consum-
mated and the authority was therefore justified in acquiring 
the area. 
There can be no question that the city has the power to 
annex the area in question under the Annexation of Un-
inhabited Territory Act of 1939 (Gov. Code, § 35300 et seq.). 
I 
/ 
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It is authorized to exercise that power in aid of the develop-
ment of a housing project as the Housing Cooperation· Law 
expressly provides that the city may "do any and all things, 
necessary or convenient, to aid and cooperate in the planning, 
undertaking, construction or operation of" a housing project. 
(Health &; Saf. Code; § 34516.) It is clear from the record 
before us that the plan and design of the present hoUsing 
project contemplated the annexation of this small parcel of 
• land which was entirely surrounded by territory 'lithin 'the 
boundaries of the city of LoS ~eles, and there ean. be no 
doubt that the city council bad knowledge that the West 
,;Los Angeles site included the county island and that annexa-
tion' of that island was contemplated. With this knowledge 
the city approved acquisition and use of the site for a housing 
project. In reliance on this approval the authority acquired 
the property. The city council on November 22, 1950, ap-
· proved the proposal to acquire the site and the request of the 
housing authority relating thereto. 
The council's approval, however, was more. than approval 
of the acquisition of the site, it was also an express concur-
rence in the authority's plan to use the site for a housing 
project. But the matter did not J"est there. After the author-
itybad proceeded with its design for 'the project to the 
point where the number and ground locations of tPe proposed 
project had been determined, it. applied to the city planning 
· Commission for a conditional use of the site for a housing 
· project. That application described the site as lIltfi'ng "tJrlly 
in vftincorponded ,~torll of fMOOtlntll oj Lor Atagelu." 
'It was also accompanied by maps and. other data clearly show-
ing the existence' of this county island in the middle of the 
site, and the contemplated location on it of some of the build-
.' ings. It was also accompanied by a copy of the authority's 
"Development Program" which embraced a narrative de-
scription of the proposed project. In it appeared the follow-
ing statement: "It (the proposed site) is situated around a 
small slum area in the county owned by four private in-
dividuals. There Ihould not be any difficulty in acquiring the 
county strip and annexing it to the City." 
There ean be no doubt that the planning commission was 
fully aware of this situation and of the Xlecessity for an-
nexation. It must, of course, be assumed that the commission 
was familiar with the record upon which it acted. In addition, 
in the planning department'. report approving and recOm-
mending this annexation, it is said with reference to the 
/ 
) 
/ 
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commission'. previouS acta, that the planning commission W ~ 
"approved the site for a housing project, which included the 
property under consideration {the county island)." Further-
more the sites selected by the authority were reported to the 
city planning department, and on June 26, 1950, the director 
of planning reported on the compatability of the West Loa 
Angeles site with the city's zoning plan. With that knowledge' 
the planning commission approved the authority's application 
on April 26, 1951. On June 26, 1951, the city council havingAl 
before ft all the data and exhibits which' were before the 
planning Commission, concurred in the latter's grant of;. 
'conditional use of the West Loa Angeles site for a housing, 
project. In its resolution of concurrence the council recited 
that this site was "fully described in the application for a 
conditional use." The description referred to the site 88' 
"lying partly in unincorporated territory of the County of 
Los Angeles." This action of the city clearly indicated its' 
approval of a housing project on the proposed West Los', 
Angeles site. Such action was taken with full knowledge of, 
and without objection 'or exception to, the fact that a small 
, part of the proposed site lay outside of the citY, and it was; 
taken after the planning commission and the council had! 
been told that acquisition of the property and its annexation! 
were contemplated. In these circumstances there was amPlei' justification for the authority's belief that whatever was neCes-
sary and could be lawfully done to bring this county island 
into the city and, therefore, make it 1JSable as part of ~e 
whole project, would be done. It was not until this action had,~ 
been taken that the authority bound itself to the acquisition' 
of title to the countyisiand. ' '. , . ~';:I' 
.. It is clear that all of the elements of estoppel are presenH 
:with knowledge of the facts the" officials of the city appro~: 
acquisition of the site and ita use for public housing, uponJ 
which actions the authority relied in acquiring the property.:~ 
Knowing that annexation was necessary to enable the authority j 
to use the site thus acquired for the housing project, may "it ,J 
1I0t be said that a legal duty was imposed upon the city1 
officials to consummate the annexation proceeding' Admittedly 1 
there is no legal barrier against such action-the ci~ council J 
has the power to annex the area. Then why should the i 
doctrine of estoppel not apply in such a case' I' 
It' has been said ,generally that a governmental &gene,: j 
may not be estopped by the conduct of its officers or employees j 
(10 Cal.Jur. 650-651), but there are many instances in which,;1 
/ 
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an equitable estoppel in fact will rUn against the government 
where justice and right reqUire it. (Farrell v. Count" of 
PlGcer, 23 Cal.2d 624 [145 P.2d 570, 153 A.L.R. 323] ; City 
of Los .A",geZes v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 373 [35 P. 1002] ; Fresno v. 
Fresno C. ct 1. Co., 98 Cal. 179 [32 P. 943]; Sa.cramento v. 
Clunu, 120 Cal. 29 [52 P. 44] ; Brown v. Town of Sebastopol, 
153 Cal. 704 [96 P. 363, 19 L.R.A.N.S. 178]; Times-Mirror 
Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.2d 309 [44 P.2d 547] ; 8utro v. 
Pettit,74 Cal. 332 [16 P. 7, 5 Am.St.Rep. 442]; City of Lo, 
Angele, v. County of Lo, AfigeZes, 9 Cal.2d 624 (72 P.2d 138, 
113 A.L.R., 370] ; Contra Cosia Water Co. 'T~ Breed, 1390al. 
432 {73 P.189] ; Count" of Los Angeles y. CUM, 185 Cal. 299 
[197 P. 67] ; La Societe .Francaise v. California Emp. Com., 
56 Cal.App.2d 534 [133 P.2d 47]; McGee v. Cit" of Lo, 
Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 390 [57 P.2d 925] ; Ernst v. Tiel, 51 Cal. 
App. 747 [197 P. 809J ; People v. Gustaf,on, 53 Cal.App.2d 
230 [127 P.2d 627J ; Hewel v. Hogin, 3 Cal.App.248 '[84 P. 
1002].) A few instances may be pointed out in which the 
justice of invoking estoppel is present as much or even less 
than here. In Times-Mirror Co., v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.2d 
309 [44 P.2d 547J, the city of Los Angeles was held estopped 
to abandon eminent domain proceedings where, in reliance 
thereon, defendant property owner had acquired other prop-
erty and constructed a building thereon. It was there said 
(p. 380), '''If the city had expressly agreed by its officers with 
defendants' grantors, even in parol, that a certain lin~ should 
constitute the boundary line between the . street and the 
grantor's property, and upon the faith of such agreement the 
grantors had erected a block' of buildings flush With the line 
of the street as agreed upon by all parties, it would be a 
hard law that would allow the city to repudiate that agree-
ment, and destroy the grantor's property. No court should 
eountenance such a thing, and an estoppel in pais will rise 
up in the pathway of a city to bar it and its principal, the 
people, from the commission of such a grievous wrong; and 
. to give the acts of this city a very limited meaning we think 
its conduct in the present ease at least equivalent to an oral 
agreement as to the location of the true boundary line of 
the street.," (To the same effect, see McGee v. Cit" of Lo • 
.Angeles,6 Cal.2d 390 [57 P.2d 925].) In City of Los Angele, 
v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 373 [35 P. 1oo2J, the city was estopped to 
claim property which it owned but said it did not and in re-
liance thereon the person who had been in possession thereof 
built a building on it. The same situation, except it was a canal 
/ 
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through a city, was involved in 7rB8M v. i'remo 0 •• 
98 Cal. 179 [32 P. 943]. Land claimed by the city as It' ree10 
was considered in StJcrtJfne",to v. OZu",ie, 120 Cal. 29 [ 
44]. In Oity of Los ,A",gele, v. Cou",t1l of Los ,A"'geles, 9 
2d 624 [72 P.2d 138, 113 A.L.R. 870], a county was 
estopped to collect from a railroad company additional 
ments for use of its land when it bad been 'accepting .,.,." .......... 
payments for 15 years., In CcmtrtJ CosttJ WtJter 00. v. ~ .......... -". 
139 Cal. 432 [73 P. 189], the city was held liable for waterl'd 
it received and was estopped to deny liability on the' .....,.~~I 
that its ordinance providing for payment was iD,ralil!l. 
TyrtJ v. BOtJra of Police Etc. Oommf'l. 82 Cal.2d 666 
710], it was held that the city was estopped to plead the sta~tQil 
of limitation in an action by an employee for a pension wh.n~ 
the pension commissioners bad erroneously told him he 
not receive a pension while he was receiving workmen'. 
pensation. Baira v. Oity of 7rB8M, 97 Cal..App.2d 886', 
P.2d 681], is particularly applicable. It was there hetd 
the city was estopped, when a pension was claimed, to 
on the invalidity of its determination made many years" luof'.~_'1 
that its employee should be credited with nine years of Mr'InM' 
, with the city. Mention is made in some of these 
where there is general power authorizing action by a 201'erDi':l1 
mental body in a particular field, the government 
estopped to assert irregularity in the ,u:ereise of that 
None of the foregoing authorities presents a clearer 
estoppel than the case at bar. " ' 
I desire particularly to call attention to the very peztiJli~ 
language used by Mr. J~ce Shenk in speaking for 
in HouMg,Authorityv. Cily of Los ,Angeles, 88 , , 
at pages 869 and 870 [243 P.2d 515] : "In Times-Mirror 
v. Superior Oourt, 3 Cal.2d 309 [44 P.2d 547], the city of 
.Ailgeles attempted to withdraw from and abandon eondemDa-. 
tion proceedings to acquire land and properties of the ~1 
Mirror Company for use in a contemplated civic center.~t 
the meantime the Times-Mirror had constructed a building bn" 
another location. The writ of mandamus issued in effect ~~ 
prevent abandonment by the ci~ of the pending condemnatio~1 
proceedings by directing the respondent court to proceed witht : 
the trial of the condemnation action. The issuance of the writ ~ 
was indicated by the application even as against the public'j 
body of the equitable doctrine of estoppel. ~ court, oi~ I 
City of Los ',AngeZes v. Cok"" 101 Cal. 878, obse"ed <at ,~~;' 
830 [35 P. 1002]) that there are limits beyond whieb even ~l 
I 
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city in representing the rights of the public might not go. 
That and the Cohn ease constitute authority that the court is 
not bound by precedent in determining what facts and cir-
cumstances compel the issuance of the writ but that the writ 
will issue as against a city or other public body or officer 
wherever law and justice require such action. The present 
matter involves more than equity and justice. As has been 
noted the statutory provisions impose the duty upon the city 
to perform the administrative acts contemplated by the state 
legislative action in a matter of state concern. The policy of 
that law is not a matter of judicial concern or control: Both 
the Congress of the United States and the Legislature of this 
state have provided for the cooperative effort evidenced by 
the contracts between the city and the housing authority. 
Each of these entities as governmental agencies of the state 
was authorized to enter into the contracts here sought to 
be enforced as a public duty on the part of the city." The 
foregoing is particularly applicable here as it correctly ap-
plied the doc~rine of estoppel rule of the Times-Mirror Com-
pany and Cohn eases to the factual situation then before this 
court which is identical with that disclosed by the record 
now before us. . 
The record in this case presents a sordid picture of political 
intrigue and chicanery and resort to fine-spun legal theories 
·on the part of a majority of the city council of the city of 
Los Angeles to abrogate its· contract with the housing author-
ity and thus obstruct, delay and defeat the housing. project 
contemplated by said contract. A narration of the official 
.acts c~ritained in the "Stipulation of Facts re Contempt" 
and the briefs of counsel should demonstrate to any unprej-
udiced mind that after December 4, 1951, a majority of the 
city counsel undertook to wreck and destroy the housing 
project here involved. The following appears without con-
tradiction: On September 14, 1951-only two days after the 
authority had acquired title to all of the county island, and, 
therefore, as soon as it could do so without atfeeting the 
interests of private owners in the area-the authority re-
ques~ed the councll to annex this county island pursuant to 
the Annexation of Uninhabited Territory Act of 1939. That 
request expressly directed attention to and quoted the pro' 
visions of paragraph 7 of the cooperation agreement relating 
to the city's promise to cooperate with the authority by "such 
other lawful action or ways as the Authority may find neces-
sary in connection with the development and constrUction of 
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,the . Project"; stated that this county strip should be. an-
nexed to the city j and requested that the necessary proceed-' 
jngs be taken to accomplish that result. ' :t 
Promptly upon receipt of this request the council began the ' 
processing procedure customarily followed in such matters. ' 
The first step was to refer the matter to the Coordinating " .
. Board of the City of Los Angeles, composed of representatives 
of various of the city's departments and of which the city, 
director of planning is chainnan. That board received reports. 
on the annexation question from:' the street widening and 
,opening division of the department of public works; the., 
.'board of public utilities and transportation j' the health dep~. 
ment; the planning ,department; and the department of , 
')\'ater and power. Each of these departments approved and. 
, recommended annexation, several of them pointing out that' 
annexation of county islands was in keeping with the city'i" 
policy of absorbing them and creating regular boundary lines. ' 
Accordingly, on October 11, 1951-less than a month after', 
the authority's request-the coordinating board made its re-
port to the council unanimously recommending and approving 
. the proposed annexation. . . ~ 
The council referred this report to its planning coJIlDlittee., 
That committee reported back on October 24, 1951. The i 
~ttee 's report stated that the coordinating board had 
recommended annexation II as requested by. the Los AngeleS 
Housing Authority"; and, had advised "that the annm-
" tion of this strip .would .conform to ·the City's policy of ab-' 
sorbing .county islands, thereby creating a more regular citY 
: .boundary line .•. !' Approval of the proposed annexation\ 
.was, therefore, recOmmended in accbrdance with the COOrdi.~: 
. 'nating board's recommendation. On November 14, 1951, the 
: council adopted the committee report and ordered prepara-: 
'tion of a resolution of intention under the Annexation of Unin-
habited Territory Act of 1939. ,'I 
Between November 14 and November 29, 1951, the city'i 
attorney prepared the resolution of intention and transmitted I 
it to the planning department. That department approved' 
the resolution on, November 29, 1951. On December 4, 195i, 
. the city .attorney tranSIDitted it to the council and the coun-
cil referred it to its planning committee. There it reSted 
until after the rendition of this court's original decision ill 
the instant cause" 
On JUly 21, 1952, the planning committee reported the reS0-
lution out to the council, but amotion to adopt it fail~d. On 
/ 
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the following day that action was reconsidered and the mat-
ter postponed to August 1, 1952. The council, however, failed 
to meet on the latter day for want of quorum. On August 
4, 1952, another motion to adopt the resolution of intention 
failed. This action was also reconsidered on the next day 
and the matter postponed to August 15, 1952. On that day 
the council amended the proposed draft so as to recite that 
the reason for the annexation was the compulsion of this 
court's mandate and the desire of the council to comply 
"in the event it should be judicially determined that com-
pliance therewith requires annexation of this territory." The 
resolution was further amended by changing the date of 
public hearing from September 4 to September ~9, 1952. 
The public hearing called for by the resolution of inten-
tion was held on September 19, 1952. No protests, oral or 
written, against the proposed annexation had been or were 
received. The council then ordered preparation of an ordi-
nance approving annexation. That was done and the ordi-
nance was introduced for adoption on September 25, 1952. 
Unanimous consent to act on it that day was requested and 
refused, respondent Barby objecting. The ordinance was, 
therefore, laid over one week. Then ensued a series of at-
tempts to procure adoption of the ordinance. All of them 
failed, the only action which the council would take being 
further postponement to November 10, 1952. In the mean-
time the application for a writ of certiorari had been denied 
on October 13, 1952, so there was no longer any basis for 
delay on the ground of the pendency of ihat proceeding. 
This refusal to annex a small, contiguous uninhabited county 
island, aimexation of which had been recommended and ap-
proved by all city departments concerned, and to which there 
is no public protest, is unprecedented in the history of the 
city. Not one request for such an annexation-and there have 
been some 84 of them from private owners and from govern-
mental agencies-has been refused since. enactment of the 
Annexation of Uninhabited Territory Act of 1939. The city's 
policy was always to annex and absorb such islands in order 
to create more regular city boundaries. 
The decision of this court ordering the issuance of a per-
emptory writ of mandate was filed on April 28, 1952, and 
the writ was issued on June 27, 1952, after one stay had been 
granted and another refused by this court and by a Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court. Decision of the cause 
/ 
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brought no immediate change in the respondents' attitude; 
notWithstanding that at the hearing on the mandate petition· 
the court was told by the city attorney that all that was needed: 
or wanted by respondents was a determination of the basic.', 
question of the city's duty to proceed with performance of, 
the cooperation agreement. The same attitude of defiance and 
refusal to act which compelled the authority to apply for: 
mandate in the 1lrst instance persisted even after that deter- t 
mination had been made. As a result, no substantial action 
in aid of the projects was taken, although there were then. 
pending previously filed requests for cooperation by way o~' 
meet closing, inspection and review of plaDs 'and apeeiA~;( 
tions, conveyance of tax-deeded lands, and annexation of theij, 
West Los AngeleS county island. '
This attitude on the part of the city council was not merely. 
the result of holding matters in suspense pending action on 
the application to the United States Supreme Court for a· 
writ of certiorari. It was rather an attitude prompted by" 
a refusal to aece4e to and comply with the writ of mandaie. 
That is best shown by a resolution, adopted by' the council 
on June 25, 1952 (one month after this court'. decision had 
become final and two days after a further Ita, had been re-
fused) in which it was ilJaid: 
". ~ • this Council action constitutes notice to' all persons 
and parties, including the Mayor; the City Housing Authority, 
its ofticers and agents, that this Council will resist an, ef-.' 
forts at furtherance of the public housing program. • • .' t, ',: 
It is further shown by the continuous dorts of respond-
ents to effect abandonment of that program, notwithstand-' 
ing the judgment, of this court. "Thus, the council persisted 
in holding an election on that question, ~en though on 1eV-
-eral occasions the city attorne, informed this court that de-' I 
cision of the basic question would settle that issue too. .Again,! 
on May 7, June 19 and June 20, 1952, the council formally 
requested the state Legislature and the Congress to enact • 
legislation permitting abandonment or cancellation of the 
program. , 
It is interesting and significant to contrast the expeditious 
way in which this matter was handled before Deeem~r 4, 
1951, with the tortuous, delaying actions of the respondents 
after that time. Of course, before December. 4, 1951, re-
spondents were cooperating in good faith in the common ob-
jective of developing and constructing these projects. After! 
that time, and notwithstanding this court'. mandate, they 
• 
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were doing their best to prevent accomplishment. of that ob-
jective, . 
It has been aptly said: "If we say with Mr. Justice Holmes, 
'Men must turn square corners wheD, they deal with the Gov-
ernment,' it is hard to see why the government ah.ould not 
be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when deal-
ing with its citizens." (48 Barv.L.Rev. 1299.) 
Frankly, I am not impreased with the contention of any 
of the respondents that their refusal to .cooperate with the 
authority by consummating the annexation proceeding was 
motivated by a conscientious desire to perform his official 
duty. The duty to cooperate cannot be distorted into a 
power to frustrate. The mandate issued by this . court was 
clear and unambiguous. Any person who honestJydesired 
to comply with it would have cooperated in eonaummating 
the annexation proceeding and thus enable the housing au-
thority to complete its project. I cannot, therefore, see any 
justification for the tortuous, delaying, and frustrating actions 
of respondents as disclosed by the record before us. 
It is my opinion, therefore, that those respondents who have 
refused to cooperate in consummating the annexation pro-
ceeding here involved, have wilfully violated the mandate 
of this court issued on June 27, 1952, in the original mandamus 
proceeding, and that an appropriate heah.ould be imposed . 
upon each of them for this violation. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. 
It is a fundamental principle of law that a municipality 
may not contract away its legislative functions without au-
thority from a competent superior power. Here the Legis-
lature has authorized a municipality in this state to :surrender 
certain legislative discretion with reference to public hous-
ing to the will of a housing authority of that city .. This may 
be done on certain conditions which are: that the housing 
authority be :first created by the city; and secondly, th8.t a 
contract of cooperation be entered into between the housing 
authority and the city with reference to public housing. Those 
conditions have long since been met in this case; and it has 
been established by prior decisions of this court that the city 
has thereby surrendered its legislative discretion to the city 
housing authority in matters concerning which it is com-
petent for the housing authority to proceed, and that it is 
the duty of the city to cooperate with the housing authority 
concerning such matters. 
/ 
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But it is not the law and it cannot rightly be held ihit 
the city may be compelled to cooperate with the hOuSirig' 
authority in matters concerning which it is beyond the power 
~f the housing authority to undertake. That is what the 
majority opinion is directing the city to do. The city hous- . 
ing authority has no jurisdiction to conduct housing opera-
tions outside of the limits of the city, whether the territory 
be large or small. The jurisdiction in that territory, under 
the statute, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the existing 
county housing' authority. That authority is not a party ·10 ~ 
this proceeding and its jurisdiction over the territory sought, 
to be annexed cannot, nnder these circumstances, be taken:: 
away by the conduct of the city or of the city housing au-~' 
thority on any theory. Estoppel does not reach it. That 
theory is a false quantity in this case. It is an equitable, 
doctrine available only to a party who is in a position to 1 
rely upon and assert it. It cannot be employed in this caSe' (j: 
as a means to confer jurisdiction on the city housing aUthOrity.'. .:'. 
to operate in county territory; a power which is denied to.,. 
it by the statute and is therefore wholly lacking. :I.:'i;' 
What the majority is here doing is to compel the city to·~ 
surrender its legislative power to decide whether or not'to': 
the discretion of the city housing authority in a matter over .' annex county territory (a conceded legislative power) .. to .......... j ...  
which that housing authority has no jurisdiction. This:'.: 
sh.Ould not. be required to do. The cooperation of the .... C1.~.tY •.. ".' . in this particular matter should come only from the vo~un-: 
tary action of the city in the exercise of its still retainel1, 
and unsurrendered legislative discretion and power. to :. ".;" 
nex contiguous unincorporated territory. . :.~ 
The question presented in this case is of great impo~ce ,1 
in the conduct of public housing operations in this state~.~ 
~ ~ disposed to elaborate rather fully on my views conc~.::. ~ ... J .. 
lng It. ··:.t"'~1 
As indicated in the majority opinion this is a proceediDg:t~' 
to have it adjudged that the members of the City CounCil fl 
failure to comply with the provisions of a peremptory writ: of the City of Los Angeles are in contempt for their alleged ....... : .•.•....• 
of mandate issued by this court on June 27, 1952. The hiI-. . 
tory of the controversy is contained in the opinion filed Apri1;~. 
28, 1952 (38 Cal.2d 853 [243 P.2d 515]; certiorari denied 'r: 
Oct. 13, 1952, 344 U.S. 836 [73 8.Ot. 46, 97 L.Ed. 41]). J 
The proceeding in which that opinion was filed and the per-. ~ 
. . ;:.~ 
"" :~ 
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emptory writ was issued will be referred to as the mandate 
proceeding. 
The purpose of the mandate proceeding was to test the 
validity of the city's action of December 26, 1951, attempting 
to abrogate, cancel and rescind the agreements authorized by 
Ordinance No. 95,222 adopted on August 8, 1949. That ordi-
nance indicated the approval by the city of the construction 
of a 10,OOO-unit low-rent housing project in cooperation with 
the housing authority of the city and the Public Housing 
Administration of the United States pursuant to the State 
Housing Authorities Law and Housing Cooperation Law 
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 34200 et seq. and 34500 et seq.). In 
that proceeding .the housing authority successfully sought to 
have this court declare invalid the attempted withdrawal of 
the city's approval of the project and the attempted cancella-
tion of agreements, and to compel the city to perform the 
acts required by the cooperation and other agreements en-
tered into by it with the housing authority for carrying out 
the contemplated project. 
In the mandate proceeding this court determined that since 
the city had approved the project, and the housing authority. 
and the Public Housing Administration had made binding 
contractual commitments and advances in respect to the 
project the city was without power, in the absence of ex-
press statutory authority, to withdraw its approval or to 
abrogate its agreements, but was under the statutory duty 
to perform them. In summarizing the duty enjoined by the 
statute upon the city it was said (38 Cal.2d at p. 871): "It 
is concluded that the law enjoins upon the city the duty to 
perform the terms of the agreements entered into with the 
housing authority and to go forward with the exercise of the 
powers which it has agreed to undertake in cooperating with 
that authority. On this record a direction that the city so 
proceed will afford the relief expedient to accomplish the 
purpose of the proceeding. It is of no concern that the man-
date does not issue directing the specific powers to be exer-
cised-since in many respects the details thereof are subject 
to the discretionary cooperative action of the city. The 
city does not contend that it will not go forward with the 
performance of the eontracts if under the law it had no 
right or power to rescind the approval of the project or to 
cancel and abrogate the agreements. tI Thereupon the order 
of the court required the issuance of a· writ of mandate 
"directing the respondents to perform the terms of the agree-
/ 
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ments entered into with the petitioner and to proceed 'Dr; 
the fu11lllment of its obligations thereunder. ".,~~ 
In the present proceeding the housing authority alle,eB': 
various particulars as to which it was claimed the city hacl, . 
agreed to take action and as to which it had failed and re->: 
fused to proceed, all in violation of this court's order in the . 
mandate proceeding. An order was issue~ directing the iIi-·'· 
dividual members of the city council to show cause why they' . 
should not be adjudged in contempt of this court for failing~', 
neglecting and refusing to obey the pe~emptory writ of m~ .. , 
date issued on June 27 J 1952, wherem they were order~, 
and commanded to perform the terms of the agreements • .1;' 
tered into with the housing authority and to proceed in .~el " 
ful1illment of their obligations thereunder.· ;~J 
It is at once apparent that the basis for any charge an1( 
finding of contempt herein must be the failure and re~·! 
of the city to perform an act which under the statute it mar 
lawfully agree to perform and which by agreement it JUiif 
bound itself to perform in the cooperative undertaking .. 6q" .• 
the return to the order to show cause it waa stipulated tb8{J 
the city had completed performance ofa separate writt~':i 
agreement to acquire and convey to. th. e h.Ousinr authority. ..ta:t. ~~.' deeded lands within the 11 sites selected for the ebji!; 
struction of the project; and bad vacated and closed atre8~1 
and alleys in those areas as provided in the cooperation ~. 
ment. The only charge remaining to be considered on .' '! .. , 
return is the alleged failure of the city to complete ann ' 
tion proceedings for the purpose of including in the site' 
lecied for the west Los Angeles (Cal. 4-21) project a ec;~ 
strip entirely surrounded by incorporated territory ........ :~. 
called unincorporated or county "island." As alleged ~ '.: ,1 
cause why it should not be compelled to complete the anneD;;! 
tion proceeding the city council contends that the 8UthOJtifo!~ 
has no power to proceed in respect to unincorporated teIi;f~}~ 
tory; ~t the statute does not authorize, .nor has the. Cl~,l 
entered mto an agreement for the annexation of unincO~J 
rated territory, and that the acts of the city councU ,n~ ~ 
reference to the annexation thereof commenced h~.retofore;~. 
~ay not be held to estop the city from denying such auth0Nt";1 
tion or agreement. . ~1 
The facts relating to the alleged failure to complete ~the 1 
Proceeding to annex the county " island" in the W.est 1Jc!I'1 l-"'*l'! 
Angeles (Cal. 4-21) project, are stipulated. The record ahcnw,~1 
the following undisputed facts: , 'd.lf:·j 
., "I:'~ .,-:..t . 
; "~" 
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As noted, Ordinance No. 95,222 approving the 10,OOO-unit 
low-rent housing project was adopted on August 8, 1949. 
Prior to that time, and from 1938, there existed and there 
still exists both a Housing Authority of the City of Los An-
geles and a Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles. 
In the cooperation agreement approved by the ordinance, 
the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles agreed to 
undertake, develop and administer the low rent housing proj-
ect on sites to be selected by the authority in the city of 
Los Angeles. The city agreed to cooperate with the lLuthority 
by vacating streets, by accepting dedication of land for new 
streets, by zoning or rezoning areas to appropriate classi1ica-
tions, and "by such other lawful action or ways as the Au-
thority may find necessary in connection with the develop-
ment and construction of the Projects." 
On August 17,1950, the housing authority advised the city 
council concerning the sites that had been selected, with tenta-
tive names of each site including the West Los Angeles area, 
(Project Cal. 4-21). Project site maps accompanied the let-
ter, but the map of the West Los Angeles area did not desig-
nate the strip in controvel'SY as county territory. On Novem-
ber 16, 1950, in a letter to the Veterans' Mairs and Housing 
Committee the housing authority requested that its proposal 
to acquire the land indicated in the selected sites be approved 
by the city council. The map of Ca1.4-21 project accom-
panying this letter showed the 43-acre project bisected by 
a strip of unincorporated territory comprising about six 
acres, or as stipulated a strip approximately 150 feet wide 
by 1,200 feet long. 
On November 22, 1950, the city council approved and 
adopted a report of its Veterans' Mairs and lIousing Com-
mittee concerning the 11 proposed sites. . The report 
recommended approval of the authority'S proposal to acquire 
the sites conditioned on the awareness that cooperative action 
affecting construction, planning, zoning, and the opening and 
closing of streets would be involved. In April, 1951, when 
the authority was in the process of acquiring land in the site, 
it applied to the city planning commission for conditional 
use permits. For the first time a surveyor's legal dePcription 
of the West Los Angeles site boundaries expressly delineated 
the project as lying partly in unincorporated territory of the 
county and partly within the city. The accompanying .archi-
tectural plans showed 62 residential buildings, four of which 
/ 
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. were to be wholly located in the unincorporated strip and 
six partly 80. A copy of the housing authority's develop-
ment program for that project for submission to the United 
States Public Housing Administration also accompanied the 
application. In that program it was stated by the housing 
authority that the· proposed West Los Angeles site was Bit-
uated around a small county slum area in a strip containing 
fourpareels which should not be difficult to acquire and 
annex to the city. On June 26, 1951, the planning commis-
sion granted the application for the conditional use permit. 
In subsequent private negoiiations consummated on Septem-
ber 12, 1951, the authority acquired the title to the four par-
cels and now holds the strip as uninhabited county terri-
to~. . 
On September 14, 1951, the authority requested the citY 
council to take proceedings on its own motion to annex the" 
county strip. In doing 80 the authority expressly invoked 
the language of the cooperation agreement whereby the 'city 
agreed to cooperate with the authority "by such other lawful 
action or ways as the Authority may find necessary in con-
nection with the development and construction of the pro-
ject. " On September 20th, the council referred the request 
to the city coordinating board, which in turn received reports : 
from various city departments. The coordinating board re-' 
ported back to the council on October 11, 1951, recommend-
ing annexation of the count;' strip. The council on October 24, 
1951, referred the authority's request to its planning eO~­
. mittee, which on the same day reported back to the council., 
On November 8, 1951, the bounda~ commissioin of the counV'. 
approved a description of the county strip. On November! 
14th the council adopted the planning committee report wliich'j 
recommended (1) annexation as conformable to the city~.81 
policy of absoroing "county islands" to create a more reg-
ular city bounda~ line; and (2) that the city attorney be· 
instructed to present the necessary resolution of intention 1 
pursuant to the Annexation of Uninhabited Territo~ Act1 
of 1939. The city attorney prepared the draft of a resol-o-
tion which was presented to the city planning commission aiiel l 
approved by it on November 29, 1951. On December "th.1 
the city attorney transmitted the draft to the citY' council l 
which in turn referred it to its planning committee. ..! 
As shown in the opinion filed in the mandate proceeding,; 
the city council attempted to withdraw the approval of and to: 
abrogate the various agreements relating to, the 'ho118big' 
) 
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projects covered by Ordinance 95,222; and the question of 
the city's power to do 80 was litigated to the ultimate deter-
mination indicated. Thereupon, on July 21, 1952, at the re-
quest of the city council, the resolution of intention in the 
annexation proceeding was reported out of the . council's 
plauning committee and its adoption moved. The motion 
failed of passage. On July 22d, the council voted to recon-
sider its action. A motion to postpone action to August 1, 
1952, was adopted by a majority vote of· eight.· On August 
1st, there was no quorum. On August 4th, with a quorum 
present, a motion to ~pprove the resolution failed of pas-
sage. On August 5th, the council again reconsidered its 
action and a motion to postpone to August 15th was adopted 
by the vote of eight councilmen. On August 15th the council, 
with a full membership present, amended the resolution to 
include a change in the hearing date and ~animously adopted 
it as amended. A public hearing was held on September 19, 
1952. No one protested the matter and the city attorney "as 
directed to prepare an ordinance approving the annexation. 
On September 25, 1952, the ordinance was introduced for 
adoption. The required vote failed. On October 2d, a motion 
for adoption again failed of passage. A motion carried to con-
tinue consideration to October 16, 1952. On the latter date, 
by the vote of eight councilmen, a motion was adopted to con-
tinue the matter to October 20th. . There was no quorum on 
October 20th, and on October 21st the matter by the same 
vote was continued to November 10th. 
On November 6, 1952, the city made its return to the order 
to show cause in this contempt proceeding. ~e issues are 
submitted on the return, the record including the stipulated 
facts, and the arguments and briefs of the parties. 
The contention that neither the authority nor the city had 
any extraterritorial power and that the city housing authority 
may not operate in county territory is unquestionably correet. 
In fact, the parties concede that the city housing authority 
may not develop any portion of the project construction pro-
gram in county territory in the circumstances of the present 
case. 
Both the authority and the city, in relation to low-rent 
housing project developments, are governed by the Housing 
Authorities Law and the Housing Cooperation Law. Under 
the statutes they are operating as arms of the state in a matter 
of state-wide concern. This status and the controlling e1reet 
of the statutes were settled by this court'. decision in the 
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mandate proceeding. There it was said (38 Cal.2d at p. 862) .~ 
"Each functioning body, the city and the housing authority; 
is a separate body politic vested with specific duties and 
powers under the Housing Authorities Law and Housing 
Cooperation Law to effect a state objective. Neither is func-
tioning independently of that state law. In pursuing the state 
objective each is governed by the state law and neither may 
exercise powers not vested or recognized by that law. The 
city and the housing authority function as administrative arms 
of the state in pursuing the state concern and effecting the 
legislative objective ...• Upon the formation of the housing I 
authority the state law thereupon and thereafter controlled: 
the city and the housing authority and no other law concern-
ing the acquisition, operation or disposition of property is 
applicable to the authority except as specifically provided. 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 34320.) •.. [The city] having ap-
proved a project and entered into a cooperation agreement, 
there was nothing left to be done by either contracting party 
but to perform administratively whatever was necessary to I 
carry the agreement into effect. (Kleiber v. City cf County of . 
San Francisco, supra, 18 Cal.2d 718, 724 [117 P.2d 657]; . 
Housing Authority v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.2d 550, 
558 [219 P.2d 457].)" 
True, as the text continues, the city may not refuse to 
cooperate in the ways that the statute and the agreements 
require. But this is not to say that either the statute or the 
cooperation agreement requires the city to cooperate with 
reference to an operation by the city housing authority in I 
territory.outside of the city which the authority had no power i 
to initiate. . 
Section 34208 of the Health and Safety Code defines the 
"area of operation" of a city authority and a county author-
ity. That section provides that the "area of operation" of a ! 
city authority does not include any area which lies within the 
unincorporated area of any county for which an authority has 
been authorized to transact business. At all times here in-
volved the Los Angeles County Housing Authority has been 
and is in existence and authorized to transact business. By 
section 34209, the "area of operation" by a county authority 
includes all of the county except the area within the territorial 
boundaries of any city for which an authority has been author-
ized to transact business. In the absence of a county authority, 
the "area of operation" of a city housing authority includes 
the city and the area within five Iniles of its territorial bound-
) 
) 
I 
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aries. Thus it may be assumed that if there were no county 
authority annexation would be uDDecessary to give jurisdic-
tion to the city housing authority to initiate operations in the 
county strip in. question. 
Ii must be clearly apparent that the powers given in the 
matter of cooperation relate., as specified in section 34509 of 
the Health and Safety Code, to "housing projects located 
within the area" in which the public body is authorized to act 
under the statute. As bearing on the city's dutY to annex 
territory the housing authority relies on section 94514. That 
section provides that any city "may change its map." But 
since there is neither power nor requirement that the housing 
authority operate outside the territorial confines of the city 
but in fact is prohibited from doing so, the provision does not 
imply a duty to annex territory as cooperation on the part of 
the city. . 
It was made clear in the opinion filed in the mandate pro-
ceeding that the city may agree to conduct authorized pro-
ceedings involving the legislative function, such as for the 
. opening and closing of streets within the city, which may be 
necessary or desirable in the cOmpletion of a project, and 
. that such authorized proceeding, pursuant to agreement come 
within the category of the administrative acts indicated by 
the statute as desirable in the consummation of the state ob-
jective. (See Op., 38 Ca1.2d at p. 868.) . 
The housing authority contends that the city has made an 
agreement to annex such county territory as the authority 
finds necessary for inclusion in the city housing project. The 
authority points to the ~uoted language of the cooperation 
agreement whereby the city agreed to cooperate "by such 
other lawful action or ways as the Authority may find neces-
sary in coDDection with the development and construction of 
the project." This provision in the agreement refers to 
matters as to which the authority may lawfully make the de-
cision of desirability or necessity. Here the matter of in-
cluding county territory in· a city housing project is in the 
first instance a question for submission to the city council for 
its determination as to necessity or desirability. The authority 
may not be deemed to have the power of direction to the city 
council as to what territory should be annexed to the city. 
Nor in any event may the city by agreement surrender that 
power in the absence of express statutory· authorization. If 
as here a county authority is in existen~, that authority has 
..,~ 
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jurisdiction in the county territory. And the city is the body; 
to determine in this instance, as iil the initial determination: 
of the nE'cessity for a city housing authority, what territory· 
should be addE'd to the city for the purpose of the operations 
of the city housing authority. The court will not read into 
the statute an implied surrender of the city power to make . 
the determination of desirability for the annexation. Since 
the statute does not authorize such surrender, the question 
of contractual obligation becomes immaterial. It follows that 
since the city does not have the power to surrender its dis-
cretion in the matter involved, and the authority does not 0 
have the right to make the determination for the city, there 
can be no conduct on the part of the city which will confer 
either. 
'l'}le case of Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Ca1.2d j 
309 l44 P .2d 547], is inapplicable. In that case both the . 
private corporation and the city of Los Angeles were per-
forming acts within their respective rights and powers. Here 
we are concerned with two public bodies, each of which is 
controlled by express statutory provisions as to the powers 
and rights which each may exercise. There is no injury to 
the authority by the claimed deprivation of a right which it 
does not have, and which in fact the city. could not confer 
under the. statute. There is no justice nor equity in favor of i 
the authority within the meaning of the decisions upon which 
it relies. Estoppel may not be invoked when the statute is 
the measure of the power. (County of San Diego v. California 
Water Etc. Co., 30 Cal.2d 817, 822 [186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 
747].) As in the cited case, there is in this instance no ap-: 
propriate statutory authority pursuant to which an agree- '11 
ment as invoked by the authority could be made by the city •• 
Consequently no legal duty of annexation has arisen. What-. 
ever action has been taken by the city departments and the , 
city council in connection with the proposed annexation must ' 
be deemed to be no more than acts in the determination that 
annexation might be desirable and should be accomplished. 
In my opinion this court has no proper function to perform 
in the present proceeding either to direct the city council 
to cooperate by annexing the territory designated by the 
housing authority, or to hold the members of the city eouncl1 
in contempt for not so cooperating. I would dismiss the 
proceeding. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
/ 
./ 
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SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I did not concur in the reason-
ing or the result in the preceding mandate proceeding (How-
i-ng Authority v. City of Los Angeles (1952), 38 Cal.2d 853 
[243 P.2d 615]) and I do not agree with any implication 
therein or in either the majority opinion or Justice Shenk's 
dissent herein that the people (whether by direct vote, or 
through their governmental representatives, the city coun-
cilmen) may by contract irrevocably bargain away their leg-
islative prerogatives. The right of the people to legislate 
whether by initiative or through elected representatives is 
the right of self-government. It means freedom instead of 
subservience to a master. The right to legislate must include 
the right to augment, to repeal and to amend as well as 
to enact. And the right. of a city as a legal entity to con-
tract should, as in the case of any other individual, natural 
or corporate, include the right to reScind on equitable grounds, 
or to breach and be subject to a suit for specific performance 
or to an action for ensuing damage liability. 
The city of Los Angeles and the Housing Authority of the 
City of Los Angeles are, respectively, separate corporate en-
tities. They entered into a contract and a dispute has arisen 
between them as to the performance of that contract. Their 
reciprocal rights and obligations and liabilities should be 
determined by the same judicial processes and by the same 
general laws as are applicable to other contracting parties. 
The holding in the preceding mandate proceeding is in my 
view inherently contrary to sound public policy and in some 
respects I think it trenches on our most fundamental gov-
ernmental and political institutions. I think that inevitably, 
if the theory that the people can by contract irrevocably sur-
render to an entity their right to legislate or otherwise govern 
themselves is persisted in and expanded (as politicians and 
sometimes courts are wont to do with attractively garbed 
theories) this seemingly isolated departure from accepted 
standards and procedures can prove to be a sorry breach 
in our constitutional dike.! But since the judgment in that 
ease has become final, whether I like it or not, if it has any 
lThat the theory is already being expanded is made evident by the fact 
tbat the majorit;y today, over the formal dissent of Mr. Justice Sbenk 
who autbond the mandllDlus opinion, are construing and applying the 
basic opinion to enforce acts not contemplated b;y its author and believed 
b;y him to be unlawful because related to property be,ond the territorial 
jurisdiction of either of the contractin, partiea. 
/ 
,) 
/ 
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validity at all, it must be accepted and dealt with insofai'~ 
as it clearly controls. However, assuming some area of· 
validity and no disposition on the part of any of the justiees 
to sap fundamentals, the judgment definitely should not be 
extended in implications or to ends which appear to be ob-
noxious to constitutional enterprise or which would transgress 
both democratic and republican concepts of the permissible 
functions of government. 
If I assume for the prior judgment the full scope of validity, 
and give it all the virtue which its learned and respected.: 
author attributes to it, then I agree with that author as)le; 
dissents, today in protest against the monstrosity which has 
been made of his opinion. That the mandamus opinion as 
construed and applied by the majority here seems monstrous 
to its author is evidenced by his dissent. That it should be 
so regarded by any lover' and defender of our traditional 
constitutional processes is to me made apparent by the majority 
and concurring opinions. Such opinions, directly or impliedly, ! 
hold that: 
a. The members of the council of the city of Los Angeles, 
although elected by the citizens as their representatives, have 
by contract with a corporation abdicated all legislative power 
within the field of the contract. 
b. Within the contractual field the councilmen are bound 
to consider not the interests or will of the people but inste8d : 
to obey implicitly the command of t.he contracting corpora- . 
tion. . 
• < .~.; ? 
c. The contract is irrevocable on the part of the citizens. 
Hence, the corporate dynasty has perpetual power. .' ::~~ 
d. The territory affected is not confined to the city of Los 
Angeles. The contracting and subservient city may be com~ . 
pelled to annex territory from other jurisdictions. (Whether 
the area of annexation may extend beyond county or $tate 
or national lines is not stated.) .. ).~ 
e. If the councilmen dare to respect the will of the people 
who elected thein, and disobey the orders of the corporate 
master, they shall be fined or imprisoned. - ,,.:' 
f. Within the field of contract the city must perpetually 
"co-operate" with the contracting corporation. And"* 
operate," as used by the majority, means implicitly obey. 
It is regrettable that in the affairs of men good ends are : 
sometimes sought by unwise means. Here, no one questio~ : 
. j 
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the desirability of better housing in place of poorer housing; 
~ertainly, better housing iR a desirable end. But to alert 
defenders of the hard won constitutional freedoms no better-
ment of housing can justify a means which exchanges a city's 
-or a person's-freedom for subservience in a substantial 
area of government. 
Whether we agree with the original mandate judgment or 
not, this proceeding should be dismissed. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied May 19, 
1953. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be Ill'anted. 
